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The analysis of long-term economic growth in 
Latin America provides us with a series of stylized 
facts over time and across countries that may allow us 
to put forward tentative interpretations for the general 
economic performance of the region, and therefore to 
determine the most important sources for long-term 
economic growth. Besides the dynamics of per capita 
income, economic outcome trend and volatility, and 
investment and saving (Sueyoshi, 2008), total factor 
productivity, income and growth convergence, and 
fiscal variables have also been identified as important 
variables that help understand the stylized facts in the 
region. 
The main purpose of this paper is to focus on 
distinguishing the impact of total factor productivity, 
which is the “X” factor behind the tangible production 
factors’ contribution, the existence of per-capita 
income convergence, and finally the effect of tax 
policy on long-term economic growth. 
I .Gross capital  formation and total  factor 
productivity
As it is suggested by a vast literature, despite physical 
and human capital accumulation plays important role 
in economic growth, they do not account for the total 
economic growth and for the growth path differences. 
Supporters of this concept do not discard the 
importance of capital accumulation in growth process, 
but question its exclusively granted qualification as 
main economic growth determinant in the neoclassical 
theory. 1 
Performing an accounting exercise2 for the regional 
countries will allow us to identify whether factor 
accumulation or TFP has been the main determinant 
of the economic growth rate. It is considered that 
the economy can be expressed by a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, where Yt denotes the output level, 
At the technology parameter, Kt the stock of capital 
factor, Lt the stock of human capital factor, and α is a 
constant for the share of capital in the total output, and 
it is assumed to have constant returns to scale.3
Y1 = A1　K1　L1          Where 0<α< 1 (1)
If we take logs and differentiate with respect to 
time we have as follows:
gy = gA + αgK + (1−α)gL (2)
In order to have an estimate of productivity, 
equation 2 is rewritten:
gA = gy −αgK −(1−α)gL (3)
As it can be clearly observed in equation 3, an 
estimation ofα, the share of capital in output is 
needed.  One method to estimate this parameter is 
by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates 
of the production function, and the other is merely 
by taking the estimated parameters suggested by 
some researchers.  De Gregorio (1992) considers two 
different capital accumulation shares in a range of 
0.65 and 0.70, and 0.45 and 0.55, for Latin American 
countries during 1950-1985.
By employing OLS, an estimated parameter α 
of 0.44 was found with 95 percent of confidence. 
Table 1 reports the regression results, where capital 
accumulation and labor explain a little more than 40 
and 50 percent of economic growth, respectively, and 
both variables show the expected sign and acceptable 
t statistics. With α equal to 40 percent, which is 
α 1-α
2within the range of previous studies’ estimations, TFP 
were computed, according to basic growth accounting 
exercises.  By using equation 3, TFP is estimated as a 
residual of the difference between actual growth and 
the expected growth from its production factors.  Table 
2 shows these results, where it is clear TFP decline 
during the 1980s for all economies, and its recovery in 
the 1990s.  The average TFP growth for the last forty 
years has been very low for the region, which suggests 
that some countries had negative TFP growth.  In 
theory this means a backward trend in technology, in 
other words, technology destruction.
 Generally speaking, many regional countries 
have been affected by protracted external and internal 
conflicts, related to guerrilla and terrorist movements, 
eventually supported by drug-trafficking.  These 
events have imposed on those countries high and 
persistent transaction costs that could be translated 
into institutional disruption, which along with the 
already physical-capital damage have affected 
especially private sector productivity.5  However, as 
it was explained in chapter one, TFP comprises a 
wide range of concepts that urge to be isolated and 
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Table 1
Latin America: Regression of Production Factors on Output (1960-2001)
R2 = 0.45,  
df=40 A t-statistic
Capital 0.411 3.389
Labor 0.508 4.191
Table 2
Latin America: Decomposition of Economic Growth (1960-2001)
GDP
growth
Capital Labor Productivity Productivity/
GDP (%)
Argentina 2.4 1.3 0.5 0.6 25
Bolivia 2.7 1.2 1.2 0.3 11
Brazil 4.7 2.2 1.5 1.2 26
Chile 4.4 1.5 1.3 1.6 36
Colombia 4.2 2.0 1.0 1.2 29
Costa Rica 4.8 2.3 1.1 1.4 29
D. Republic 5.4 2.9 1.3 1.2 22
Ecuador 4.4 2.1 0.8 1.4 32
El Salvador 3.1 1.4 1.0 0.7 23
Guatemala 4.0 1.5 1.5 1.0 25
Haiti 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.3 33
Honduras 4.0 2.3 1.1 0.6 15
Mexico 4.6 2.4 1.0 1.2 26
Nicaragua 2.3 1.3 0.7 0.3 13
Panama 4.4 2.2 0.9 1.3 30
Paraguay 4.5 2.2 1.3 1.0 22
Peru 3.1 1.4 0.7 1.0 32
Uruguay 1.8 0.8 0.2 0.8 44
Venezuela 2.7 1.7 1.1 -0.1 -4
LAC
Avg. 60s 4.9 2.5 1.2 1.2 24
Avg. 60-70s 5.0 2.6 1.1 1.3 26
Avg. 80s 1.4 0.5 0.6 0.3 13
Avg. 60-80s 3.8 2.2 1.1 0.5 21
Avg.90s 3.2 1.6 0.5 1.0 31
Avg. 60-90s 3.6 1.5 1.0 1.1 30
Discrepancies in the totals are due to rounding.
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analyzed individually in order to reach to concrete 
determinants of economic growth.  TFP could 
include not only technological change, technological 
transfer and its spillover effects, but also managerial 
techniques, and all sorts of innovation leading toward 
an increase of productivity, basically in benefit of the 
production process. Technological change implies 
industrial innovation, information technology nets 
through telecommunications and internet, research 
and development programs (R&D) in academic and 
entrepreneurial spheres, technological transference, 
and so forth.  Then it can be measured by using 
as proxy variables, the number of patents, number 
of internet and personal computer users, R&D 
expenditure, number of scientists and science journals, 
and royalties and licenses. In the region information 
technology6 has given the big and last impulse to Latin 
America7 countries to be connected to the rest of the 
world, but the percentage of the population who can 
have access to internet services is relatively small. The 
same applies for people involved in R&D8 activities, 
number of patents,9 exports with technological 
component, and number of scientific and academic 
publications.10
Source:  World Development Indicators. The World Bank (2004).
Table 3
Latin America: Indicators of Innovation and Technology (2001)
Exports R&D Patents Trademarks Royalties Journals Internet 
users
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Argentina 8.6 0.45 7533 61828 0.164 2361 9 
Bolivia 14.7 0.29 123 n.a. 0.045 33 2 
Brazil 18.0 0.77 64686 n.a. 0.225 5144 5 
Chile 0.8 0.54 3120 n.a. 0.534 879 20 
Colombia 7.0 0.25 1799 12788 0.084 207 3 
Costa Rica 28.0 0.20 52437 n.a. 0.300 69 10 
D. Republic 0.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.104 6 2 
Ecuador 4.4 0.09 490 n.a. 0.289 20 3 
El Salvador 7.1 2.20 67 n.a. 0.152 3 1 
Guatemala 7.5 0.16 226 9821 -0.007 14 2 
Haiti 6.0 n.a. 6 1456 0.000 2 0 
Honduras 1.2 n.a. 156 5045 0.164 11 1 
Mexico 22.0 0.43 66916 46146 0.061 2291 4 
Nicaragua 3.2 0.15 145 n.a. 0.000 8 1 
Panama 1.1 0.35 160 13223 0.300 37 3 
Paraguay 4.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. -2.399 5 1 
Peru n.a. 0.08 992 n.a. 0.085 229 11 
Uruguay 2.2 0.26 616 9741 0.034 144 12 
Venezuela 2.2 0.34 2348 23703 0.002 448 5 
LAC avg. 7.7 0.44 11872 20417 0.007 627 5 
USA 33.2 2.69 331770 292460 -0.239 165430 44 
Japan 28.1 2.98 486205 145830 0.016 46951 37 
France 23.9 2.15 160181 111780 -0.020 27421 14 
Germany 17.6 2.48 262554 97325 0.144 38044 30 
Spain 7.8 0.94 202443 98739 0.225 11591 14 
Singapore 61.5 1.88 62471 145 n.a 1371 32 
Malaysia 58.2 0.40 44948 n.a. 0.586 336 17 
(1)High Technology exports (% of manufactured goods).
(2)Research and Development expenditures (% of GDP).
(3)Patents applications, residents and nonresidents.
(4)Trademarks, applications filled.
(5)Net Royalties and licenses payments and receipts (%GDP).
(6)Scientific and technical journals.
(7)Internet users over population.
Data for the year 2001 and for 2000 when 2001 is not available.
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 In particular, Latin America is a region where 
technological progress comes from importing 
technology or training labor force with new skills. If 
we take a closer look to the figures in the region, it 
can be noticed that there is a wide disparity among 
countries, and that Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica and Mexico evidence a better technological 
performance11.  Besides Costa Rica, Paraguay and 
Bolivia appeared to be exceptional cases in Latin 
America regarding certain technological indicators.12 
Easterly and Levine (2001) and De Gregorio (1992) 
do not deny the importance of capital accumulation in 
the economic growth of Latin American countries, but 
estipulate that its contribution is not as determinant 
as it is in the case of Southeast Asian countries, and 
add that total factor productivity is a relevant variable 
instead.  However, since there is no much evidence of 
technological innovation13 in the region, it is assumed 
that spillover effects in addition to economic policy 
are important determinants of economic growth in 
LAC economies.
By observing the results in Table 2 we can come 
across with interesting empirical conclusions that can 
question basic theoretical assumptions.  If we look 
at this table on a cross-country perspective, it can be 
observed that the fast growing economies during the 
period 1960-2001 also have a high contribution ratio 
of productivity growth on economic growth.  If this 
relationship exists, it means that productivity growth 
is endogenous against all odds and contrary to the 
main neoclassical assumptions.  According to this 
school of thought, economic growth in the long term 
is only caused by an increase in the production factors, 
capital and labor; and population and technology are 
exogenous variables. 
If we analyze the same table on a time-series 
perspective, the same pattern is observed.  During 
high growth periods, productivity growth is also 
high.  The accelerated growth in the sixties and 
seventies due to intensive industrialization process 
with emphasis on import-substitution is reflected on 
productivity contribution of around one quarter of the 
GDP during these decades.  In the nineties, economic 
growth rate in average for Latin American and 
Caribbean countries was the highest in the period, and 
productivity rate was also the highest. On the other 
side, lower productivity growth rates correspond to 
lower economic growth rates, as in the eighties.  This 
trend suggests the existence of the aforementioned 
productivity endogeneity that confirms a strong 
relationship between this variable and economic 
growth.  This in turn calls for further analysis on the 
economic determinants and their effects on economic 
growth and productivity growth. 
II.Income Per Capita Convergence
The next figures 1 and 2 give us some hints regarding 
comparative growth paths. These figures are expected 
to validate the convergence hypothesis- it means a 
systematic tendency for poor countries to grow faster 
than rich ones, which would allow them to catch up- 
and show whether some LAC countries meet this 
theoretical concept (Barro, 1989). At global level, 
the neoclassical models of economic growth that are 
supposed to predict income per capita convergence, 
fail in their intent and this issue became one of the 
main critiques in the mainstream economics. 
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Easterly and Levine (2001) remark that the 
economic history in the last two centuries has been 
the story of the differences between the richest and the 
poorest countries, instead of the story of poor countries 
convergence to the richest steady state. However, for 
Latin American economies’ convergence has been 
found,14 which is pretty clear for certain group of 
countries.  One possible reason for that discrepancy 
between world-wide and regional results may be 
the existence of some relative homogeneity in this 
heterogeneous group. A cross country analysis in a 
region avoids some extreme differences compare to 
world-wide cross country studies.15
In the examination of long-term economic process 
there are historical and institutional reasons that make 
Latin American countries particularly interesting, 
and that could be the reason for certain homogeneity. 
These countries shared a common colonial institutional 
background in that they were all Spanish or Portuguese 
colonial territories that prior to their independence 
were governed with a fairly common16 institutional 
economic framework (Nishijima and Mc Cleery, 
1997).  In fact, nowadays the intra-relationships in 
the region have become closer due to regional17 and 
bilateral agreements, and contagion and domino’
s effects are ineluctable. Looking at both figures, 
if countries were converging, we were supposed to 
be able to trace a negative-slope line.  Although the 
points are scattered, it can be said that Chile, Uruguay, 
Argentina and Venezuela are converging.  The poorer 
countries with less than US$ 800 income per capita 
in 1960 are comparatively more dispersed, and do not 
evidence convergence.  The reason for this may hinge 
on the fact that many of these countries were involved 
in external and internal economic and social conflicts 
- guerrilla, drug-trafficking, neighbor conflicts - which 
have affected their growth performance.18 
While in Figure 2, taking as starting point 1990, 
clearly two groups can be identified. The first one 
corresponds to the countries with annual income 
per capita of less than US$ 1,500, and the second 
group with more than US$ 1,500. Two interesting 
conclusions can be drawn from Figure 2. The first 
group follows no fix pattern, the points remained 
dispersed, and the countries that can be placed in this 
group are the same as the poorest ones in Figure 1. 
Considering 1990 as the initial year, the graphic shows 
us a clear second group, which neatly converges. 
Within the group of countries that were relatively well-
off by the beginning of 1990s there is convergence 
to same extent. If we compare Figure 1 and 2, some 
countries such as Brazil, Costa Rica and Mexico have 
entered to this convergent group, being possible to 
understand that the 1990s stabilization and structural 
reforms pushed them into this group. There is a clear 
relationship between growth and investment (Figure 4) 
and it is consistent with the positive relation provided 
by the theory.
 
III.Fiscal policy 
A considerable number of notable economic growth 
model researchers stipulate the importance of fiscal 
policy as growth determinant (Barro, 1991; De 
Gregorio, 1992; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; De 
Gregorio, 2002). Particularly in Latin America the 
analysis on fiscal policy has almost exclusively been 
centered on their effect on monetary aggregates 
and inflation, and economic growth, during the last 
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Figure 3
Latin America: Growth and GDP per capita 
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15 years. This scenario serves as context for the 
development of recent works on the nexus long-term 
economic growth and fiscal policy (Fischer, 1991, 
1993; Loayza et al., 2002, De Gregorio and Lee, 
2003). According to Gavin and Perotti (1997), there 
are qualitative differences between Latin America and 
OECD country fiscal outcomes.  First, fiscal outcomes 
have been more volatile in the region than in industrial 
economies.  Second, fiscal policy has been pro-
cyclical, and therefore economically destabilizing, in 
particular in recessions when exactly fiscal policy is 
called to play its countercyclical role (See Figure 5). 
Finally, fiscal shocks have been particularly disruptive 
in Latin America.
Reasons for pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy in the 
region are finance constraint faced by Latin American 
government during crisis, limited capital markets, 
inflationary environment, and the effect of the business 
cycle in electoral periods. Pertaining to the latter, 
explanations for this can be found in the political 
economy reason based on the increase of demands 
from all different groups as a reaction of a positive 
shock in revenues.  Every group will have a “bigger 
piece of the pie,” finally the sum of all the demands 
will exceed the sum of the total increase in revenues. 
Likewise there are other important characteristics that 
make Latin America fiscal policy unique from the 
other countries’. In the region, economies rely more 
on value added taxes (VAT) than income taxes that is 
the case for developed countries. In LAC economies 
the tax base is much smaller, which means that deficits 
can be considerably higher when they are measured 
as a proportion of total revenues.  This aspect of fiscal 
policy may be significant when it comes to measure 
the state capability to raise additional resources to 
Figure 5
Latin America: Growth and fiscal deficit (1970-2001)
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Table 4
Latin America: Fiscal indicators (1960-2001)
Tax
Social 
security
Education 
expen-
ditures
Subsidies Debt serviceTotal On goods
On 
Income
On intl.
Trade
Argentina 11.6 31.1 7.2 8.7 27.9 2.9 51.1 47.5
Bolivia 11.3 41.8 5.2 8.5 9.4 3.4 24.2 37.4
Brazil 17.5 21.7 16.7 2.8 27.3 4.1 44.3 51.5
Chile 20.8 41.1 16.7 8.4 9.8 3.6 48.4 35.8
Colombia 10.6 28.7 30.9 16.1 7.7 2.6 43.3 29.9
Costa Rica 17.8 31.7 13.1 18.7 25.3 4.6 25.6 22.7
D. Republic 13.0 26.5 18.1 38.2 3.9 2.0 13.3 13.7
Ecuador 12.7 20.8 44.8 27.1 0.0 2.4 20.0 30.8
El Salvador 10.0 36.1 18.2 12.2 12.3 2.5 6.8 13.3
Guatemala 9.0 32.0 13.2 29.9 3.1 1.7 11.1 14.7
Haiti 10.0 23.6 12.3 27.3 0.2 1.4 20.0 10.4
Honduras 12.1 29.0 22.9 34.1 2.3 3.6 3.8 24.2
Mexico 12.9 52.9 33.0 7.0 13.9 3.8 29.1 35.8
Nicaragua 20.6 43.9 11.7 17.6 11.3 3.4 16.0 27.7
Panama 18.4 15.7 20.4 11.3 22.1 4.8 19.8 8.8
Paraguay 9.6 26.6 12.1 17.6 7.0 2.4 18.7 14.5
Peru 12.2 45.3 17.5 17.2 3.5 3.1 21.3 30.0
Uruguay 22.7 38.8 8.8 8.4 27.8 2.8 51.3 28.3
Venezuela 16.8 11.5 51.5 9.2 4.0 4.5 29.3 20.4
LAC avg. 14.5 35.1 23.8 8.2 17.9 3.6 36.8 39.0
All ratios are shown as a percentage of GDP, except for debt service, that is a ratio of total exports.
cover the deficit.  These issues will be analyzed deeply 
in the next sections.
In models with technology as exogenous variable 
and diminishing returns to the factors of production, 
economic policy can only have transitional effects on 
growth. That is the rationale of traditional neoclassical 
growth models.  However, in models that emphasize 
technological change with spillover effects, national 
policies can enhance the factors of production and 
affect directly and positively economic growth. For 
that reason, finding what sort of economic policies 
may be compatible with endogenous growth theory 
based on technological factors is one of the main 
purposes of this thesis.
According to Easterly and Rebelo (1993) in 
order to isolate the effect of each fiscal variable, it is 
assumed that the impact of a change in a fiscal variable 
on government revenue or expenditure is compensated 
with lump sum taxes or subsidies.  For example, it 
is commonly predicted that taxed on investment and 
income have a negative impact on growth, by affecting 
directly private returns to accumulation.  However, 
not all sort of taxes lead to a decrease in growth. 
Depending on the type of model under study, the 
connection between taxes and economic growth could 
be either positive or negative, as we will see later on.
1.Saving and taxes
Saving has clear links with fiscal variables.  For 
example, determined taxes will tend to have effects on 
savings through affecting inter-temporal consumption 
substitution.  For instance, changing the tax base 
from income to consumption will encourage frugality 
in the economy, or expectations for reductions of 
international trade taxes will increase savings due 
to postponing present consumption.  However, as 
Edwards (1994) has pointed out, there are doubts on 
the effectiveness of these tax mechanisms to increase 
aggregate savings. In our panel data, savings are 
correlated to income taxes (0.8), and negatively to 
VAT (-0.4) and international trade taxes (-0.2) as it 
is expected. However, the correlation for savings and 
other fiscal aggregates like total revenues (-0.1) and 
fiscal balance (-0.3.) are not significant. Also there are 
interesting suggestions that discard the effectiveness 
of taxation changes, and instead recommend the use 
of public savings via expenditures reduction as fiscal 
policy for economic growth.
2.Government and private consumption
Despite government and private consumption are 
components of the final aggregate consumption, 
government consumption crowds out  private 
consumption,19 but in less than one by one proportion, 
due to the substitution effect between the two 
variables.
According to the sort of tax another stylized fact 
has been observed in cross section and time series 
data. Taxes on income have shown an increasing trend, 
taxes on international trade have depicted a decreasing 
trajectory while taxes on goods and services have 
remained the same.  In Figure 7 it is clear that before 
the eighties, value-added taxes, income taxes and 
international trade taxes had a very similar economic 
behavior, because Latin American countries had 
traditionally relied on indirect taxes, which include 
good and services and international trade taxes, as 
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Figure 7
Latin America: Tax Revenue Components Trend (1970-2001)
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8much as they relied on direct taxes. In the 1980s, due 
to full-fledge economic reforms in Chile, and partial 
in other countries-Bolivia and Mexico, a decreasing 
trend for international trade and an increasing trend 
for goods and services taxes were observed.  In the 
1990s, when several countries joined the ‘reformers 
club’-Argentina, Dominican Republic, El Salvador 
and Peru-those divergent trends became more evident. 
Tax revenues are not as volatile as GDP growth rate is. 
However, if we take a look at the standard deviations 
of each total revenue component at cross-country and 
time series level, we will find some interesting results.
Among VAT, income and international trade 
taxes, the most volatile in the region for the period 
1960-2001 has been taxes on goods and services 
(5.3). This figure contrast evidently with the total 
revenue volatility of 0.8, and income tax (1.2) and 
international trade tax (2.8) volatility.  If we analyze it 
in more detail, VAT is the only tax that has gradually 
has increase its volatility over the decades (1.3, 2.4 
and 5.7), while for the income and international trade 
taxes, volatility has remained with no major change. 
Taxes on goods and services became very volatile 
in the 1990s (5.7).  I believe that changes in the tax 
systems as part of the structural reforms in several 
countries have contributed to this to happen.
Also across countries, volatility analysis gives 
interesting results.  The most volatile economies 
in international trade taxes have been the smallest 
economies in the region, in terms of GDP per 
capita.  Almost all Central American and Caribbean 
economies plus Ecuador shows very volati le 
international trade tax revenues. On the contrary, 
Central American economies volatility for goods 
and services and income taxes has been very low 
compared to the region average, especially for VAT 
which has been particularly volatile in the region, 
as it was documented before. Some individual cases 
to be emphasized are Argentina with highly volatile 
tax revenues of any sort. Venezuela has also volatile 
VAT and income taxes, El Salvador and Ecuador, 
on the contrary, have high volatility for income an 
international trade taxes. 
Considering the differences of fiscal account 
results between developed and developing countries, 
and being aware of the heterogeneity within the region, 
where some countries are much closer to developed 
country standards, it was expected to find certain 
relationship between country size and certain sort of 
taxes that applies for OECD economies. For instance, 
it was expected to find a positive relationship between 
income taxes, and output per capita and population, 
but instead not clear relationship was found. In the 
case of international trade tax revenue, it decreases as 
the GDP per capita increases. When the latter variable 
is replaced by population the negative relationship 
remains.
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Latin America: Tax Composition (1970-2001)
Figure 9
Latin America: Income Level and International Trade Tax (1970-2001)
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Latin America: Population and International Trade Tax (1970-2001)
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9Conclusions
This is the list of stylized facts on long-term economic 
growth in Latin American countries that can be drawn 
regarding total factor productivity, income-growth 
convergence and fiscal policy.
Stylized fact 1: In models that emphasize technological 
change with spillover effects, economic policies can 
enhance the factors of production and directly affect 
and have a positive impact on economic growth. 
Despite physical and human capital accumulation 
plays important role in economic growth, this does not 
account for the total economic growth or for growth 
path differences.  Total factor productivity is the ‘third’ 
factor that has contributed to long-term economic 
growth in the region.
Stylized fact 2: The proportion of TFP increases with 
the rate of growth, especially in the 1990s, when its 
participation as an output source increased. However, 
TFP is composed of an assortment of different 
variables, one of them technological innovation or 
spillover effects, and since there is not much evidence 
of technological innovation in the region, it is assumed 
that positive externalities in addition to economic 
policy are important determinants of economic growth 
in LAC economies.
Stylized fact 3: In cross-country and time-series 
analysis, fast growing economies during the period 
1960-2001 also have a high contribution of the ratio 
productivity growth on economic growth.
Stylized fact 4: There is empirical evidence of 
convergence in Latin America. One possible reason 
for the discrepancy between worldwide lack of 
convergence and the regional results may be the 
existence of some relative homogeneity in the sample.
Stylized fact 5: Direct taxes will tend to have effects 
on savings through or by affecting inter-temporal 
consumption substitution.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
1 De Gregorio (1992), De Gregorio and Lee (1999), 
Fajnzylber and Lederman, Easterly and Levine (2001), 
and Carranza, Fernández-Baca and Morón (2003) have 
made important contributions to the academic literature 
on Total Factor Productivity in Latin America.
2 According to Easterly and Levine (2001), there is 
a significant TFP variation across Latin American 
countries, with an average of around 30 percent, while 
OECD countries registered 50 percent in average, and 
for East Asia economies, capital accumulation remains 
as the key component of economic growth. De Gregorio 
(1992) reports an average rate of 4.2 percent during the 
period 1950-1980, of which 51 percent is explained by 
investment, 30 percent by population growth, and the 
remaining 19 percent by TFP.
3 It is assumed that there is no adjustment costs in capital 
accumulation, and that there is perfect competition in 
the production factors' markets, therefore they are paid 
according to their social marginal price.
4 As De Gregorio and Lee (1999) report world-wide TFP 
studies have used a capital share of 0.4. While for same 
kind of data, Fischer (1991, 1993) considers a coefficient 
of 0.38.  Beck et al. (2000) estimate a coefficient between 
0.3 and 0.4. For their part, Easterly and Levine (2001) 
report a 0.5, and Loayza et al. (2002) a 0.35 coefficient in 
average for Latin American countries.
5 Carranza et al (2003) refer to three possible explanations 
to this phenomenon. First, the sub-utilization or 
misallocation of inputs can push the TFP into a downward 
trend, with a severe lost in productivity. Second, the 
existence of informal sector, which is not included in 
TFP calculation, can be determinant for low productivity 
in the region. And third, the high unemployment and 
underemployment levels cause mismatches between the 
actual jobs and the training employees have.  In the region 
a large proportion of people work in activities for which 
they are overqualified, but due to high unemployment 
rates, those workers have no other option than engage in 
jobs they cannot maximize their capabilities. Additionally, 
Prichett (1997) suggests that TFP calculation includes 
the amount of investment, but not its productivity. Then 
investment is overvalued, because it does not exclude the 
huge, unproductive or frivolous projects implemented 
in the name of some allegedly worthy cause, that were 
abundant during the 1960s and 1970s all over the region.
6 Despite the rapid growth, it is estimated that in 2002 only 
5 percent of the population had internet access, while 
for Americans this ratio is 44 percent, for Japanese 37, 
for Malaysians, French and Spanish around 15, and for 
Germans and Singaporeans around 30 percent. 
7 The IADB (2001) employs the Global Competitive Report 
index.  This index ranks countries based on innovation 
and technological adaptation capacity, and shows that 
most of Latin American countries have performed very 
poorly, except for Chile, Brazil and Mexico. According 
to this report, while innovation is the major force behind 
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economic creativity in industrial countries, it is the 
transfer of technology that plays a more important role in 
the developing world and particularly in Latin America. 
This is due to the lack of credit and institutional support, 
such as weak rule of law and property rights issues, as it 
is noted in the report. 
8 The United States, Canada, Western Europe and East 
Asia account for the 99 percent of the total number 
of patents in the world (IADB, 2001), leaving for this 
region a participation of 0.2 percent.  This figure could 
be confirmed if we take a look of Table 2, where the 
average number of patents for LAC countries is around 
6 times less than Singapore and 30 times less than the 
United States. For expenditures on R&D as percentage 
of the national income, the United States registers almost 
3 percent, Canada 1, while no Latin America country 
surpasses 0.5 percent, except for Brazil.
9
 If we considered exports with high technology content, 
LAC average is similar to the Spanish indicator, as it can 
be observed in Table 2, but in comparison to the United 
States, Japan, Singapore and Malaysia, this average is one 
forth or in the worst case, almost one tenth. If registered 
patents and filled trademarks applications are analyzed, 
the gap becomes even wider.  In average Latin American 
countries accounts for one thirtieth of American registered 
patents, or one twentieth of American trademarks. In 
terms of royalties, LAC countries are net payers, as the 
positive figures in Table 2 indicates payments.  On the 
contrary the United States is net receptor for this concept, 
while European countries, Japan and Southeast Asian 
countries show less difference between payments and 
receipts.
10
 Human resources in Latin America are also an obstacle 
for innovation. The number of scientific and technical 
publications is by far less than the number registered by 
other countries.
11
 For the variable internet users, Chile registers a figure 
four times higher than the average, and Argentina, 
Uruguay, Costa Rica and Peru are at the same level, 
doubling the LAC mean. Based on the number of 
scientific and technical journals the leader countries 
in  human resources  are  a lso  over  the  regional 
average, pertaining registered patents by residents and 
nonresidents and trademark applications.  These countries 
are Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. These countries 
represent almost 80 percent of the total GDP of the 
region, and are also considered the most industrialized. 
It should not surprise us that the three largest economies 
in the region, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, plus 
Costa Rica export manufactured goods with a high 
technological component higher than the Latin American 
average. The inclusion of the Costa Rican economy in 
this group with the highest index, almost four times than 
the regional average, is an unexpected result. It was 
stated that expenditures on research and development 
are by far lower than in the United States, Japan, Europe 
or Southeast Asian countries, and it barely reaches 0.5 
percent of the GDP, except for Brazil (0.7 percent). 
For this variable, the leader countries remain the same, 
Argentina, Chile and Mexico, and El Salvador. The 
latter country shows an outstanding 2.2 percent of R&D 
expending which surpasses the average.
12
 Paraguay registered considerable revenues as collector 
of royalties and license fees (Table 2) due exclusively 
to the hydroelectric power resources.  On the other side, 
Bolivia, surprisingly enter the group of high technology 
exports with a rate that doubles the LAC average. 
Bolivia’s exports are mainly composed by natural gas 
and processed minerals, such as non-raw gold, tin alloys, 
zinc, ore, silver and platinum concentrates.  Also 28 
percent of total Costa Rica’s exports come from high 
technology exports, in addition to its already known 
agricultural products.  If we take a look of its detailed 
balance of payment, Costa Rica is increasingly exporting 
from 1998 office-machine parts, and from 1999, medical 
instruments.
13
 In LAC countries technological change is not the leading 
determinant of economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 
2001).
14
 According to Sala-i-Martin (2002) the initial level of 
income is the most important and robust variable.
15
 The more homogenous the group the more convergence 
can be observed, as it was proved empirically by Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1997) when they developed a panel 
analysis for the United States across different states.
16
 After their independence from European monarchies, 
Latin American countries' political processes have 
been similar to certain extent, as well as their economic 
performances. Their common colonial history left a 
fairly significant legacy of political, cultural and social 
institutions that became the basis for the new republics.
17
 The most important regional groupings are the Andean 
Group, MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market), the G3 
(Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela), Central American 
Common Market (CACM), and CARICOM (Caribbean 
Community).
18
 This is the case of Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Haiti, Guatemala, Colombia, and Peru.
19
 According to Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) a cut in 
government consumption causes no expectations for an 
increase of taxes, which in turn has positive effects on 
private consumption. This is called the “German view” 
which is against all Keynesian principles, even in the 
medium term.
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Crecimiento Económico de Largo Plazo, Factor Total de 
Producción, Convergencia y Política Fiscal en América Latina: 
Hechos estilizados desde la década de los sesenta
SUEYOSHI Ana 
Resumen
América Latina presenta un conjunto de “hechos estilizados” cuya identificación contribuirá a bosquejar 
una tentativa interpretación del comportamiento general de la región, y por ende reconocer los más importantes 
determinantes de crecimiento económico de largo plazo.
Además de la dinámica del ingreso per cápita, la tendencia y volatilidad del producto, así como la relevancia 
de las variables inversión-ahorro en la determinación del crecimiento de largo plazo, el factor total de producción, 
la convergencia del ingreso per cápita y la política fiscal han cumplido un rol fundamental en la dirección de la 
trayectoria de crecimiento de largo plazo.
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